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Few topics in fiscal affairs have received the concentrated attention
that has been devoted to integration and dividend relief over the past
five years.l During that time, the United Kingdom reversed its earier
decision to abandon an imputation system in favor of the classical system,
Germany considered seriously adoption of complete integration before con-
verting its split-rate system to a hybrid form of complete dividend relief
which employs both a split rate and a shareholder cr~dit, Italy adopted
complete dividend relief, and the United States flirted casually with
integration and more seriously with dividend relief.2 Though the
United States is hardly alone in its adheranceto the classical system,
its position may become increasingly uncomfortable.3
The purpose of this paper is to examine .international aspects of
dividend relief. Until recently these have received relatively little
attention in American discussions of integration and dividend relief.
They have, of course, been more important in the European debate
because of the relatively greater reliance on foreign trade and international
capital flows in Europe. A substantial part of the paper is devoted to
discussion of European approaches to these problems. A working acquaintance
with systems of dividend relief employed in European countries now or in the
recent past is essential for at least two reasons. First, if one is familiarwith such systems, he does not need to "reinvent the wheel." Instead, he can
copy the best features of other systems and avoid the worst. Second, any
country considering adopting dividend relief will naturally want to design a
system that can be coordinated with those in other countries. Moreover,
through careful design it may be possible to increase the country's bargaining
position in international tax negotiations.
In order to allow full attention to be devoted to internationalEuropean common market. Section VII considers the effects of dividend relief
from the perspective of European countries dealing with the United States,
which still uses a classical system. But this section is of more general
relevance because in considering dividend relief the United States would
confront other countries with classical systems, as well as those with divi-
dend relief (for which Section V is more relevant).
II. THE U.S. POLICY DISCUSSION
American interest in integration and dividend relief seems to have
had its genesis in at least three influences. The earliest, but not
necessarily the strongest, is the academic infatuation with integration,
based on the Haig-Simons definition of income for tax purposes and rein-
forced by the analysis and conclusions of the Royal Commission on Taxation
in Canada (1966). Academic advocates of integration have ordinarily stressed
its distributional advantages and its neutrality toward corporate finan-
cial policy and the allocation of economic resources. Interestingly, they
have seldom mentioned the second, and perhaps the most influential, argument
made for dividend r.elief in the recent debate: stimulus to capital for-
mation. Those who favor dividend relief as a way to encourage saving and
investment implicitly base their argument upon the questionable assumption
that revenues lost in dividend relief would not be made up in a way that
maintained the progressivity of the income tax. A final impetus to
American interest in dividend relief was European activity in the field.
As was true earier when the countries of Europe where adopting the tax on
value added, some American observers seem to have believed that the United(4)
States should follow the European path. Presumably this desire for emula-
tion was based at least in part on perceived economic advantages; but part
of the attraction may also have been the ~stique of the relatively unknown.
The United States has, of course, not adopted either integration or
dividend relief. It has, however, come closer to doing so than at any
time during the four decades since it repealed the tax on undistributed
profits levied briefly during the 1930's. In 1975 the Secretary of the
Treasury, William Simon (1975), presented Congress with a proposal for the
complete elimination of double taxation of dividends similar to that now
in effect in Germany. Subsequently the Treasury Department issued
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977), a white paper which argued that
full integration was both desirable and administratively feasible and pre-
sented dividend relief as an attractive second best solution if full
integration were rejected. Coming at the end of the Ford administration,
Blueprints resulted in no direct political action. It did, however, add
important weight to the academic arguments for integration and stimulated
considerable further discussion. There was a widespread expectation that
President Carter, goaded in part by the perceived need to do something for
capital formation, would propose a system of partial dividend relief in
his 1977 tax message. When Carter did not do so, Chairman Al Ullman of
the House Ways and Means Committee (1978) introduced legislation which
was said to be patterned closely after the treasury proposals rejected by
the White House. The 1978 tax act did not contain dividend relief. And
given that it did contain important provisions reducing the taxation of
long-term capital gains, pressure for fiscal stimulus to capital formationand interest in integration and. dividend relief may have subsided.
It is interesting to speculate on why efforts to obtain integration
or dividend relief were not successful. Perceived administrative dif-
ficulties must surely be one reason. Difficulties of implementing full
integration had been known for at least 30 years5 and the Canadian
Royal Commission on Taxation and Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform did not
fUlly dispel fears that full integration could not be administered. Of
course, dividend relief is a reasonable fallback position for advocates of
integration, and European experience provides evidence that it could be
implemented.6 But the existence of. tax preferences creates administra-
tive problems and raises policy issues that had been only imperfectly per-
ceived in earlier discussions, including those of the Royal Commission on
Taxation, in Blueprints, and perhaps in Europe.7 Decisions must be
made on whether tax preferences are to be passed through to shareholders
or nullified when preference income is distributed. Moreover, regardless
of which decision is made, it is necessary to have stacking rules (at least
implicit in the law) for the determination of the presumed order in which
income is paid from fully taxed and various types of preference income.8
Some ways of treating preference income are easier to administer than
others; these are not, unfortunately, the ones for which the most co~
pelling case can be made on grounds of public policy. And, in any event,
feelings run high about the appropriate way to treat tax preferences under
dividend relief. Finally, international flows of dividends add an addi-
tional layer of complexity to the administration of dividend relief, espe-
cially when combined with tax preferences.(6)administrative difficulties and uncertainties of economic effects men-
tioned above. Given this, it is hardly surprising that dividend relief
has no strong and influential allies and that those seeking to use the tax
system to stimulate capital formation have returned to more traditional
approaches such as the preferential treatment of long-term capital gains.
III. ALTERNATIVE EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO DIVIDEND RELIEF
This section 4escribes briefly the systems of dividend relief now
being used in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the split-rate
system used in Germany until 1977, and the approach to dividend relief con-
tained in the 1975 draft directive of the Commission of the European
Communities.lO Only the basic structure of the systems is given; pri-
mary emphasis is devoted to description of the taxation of international
flows of dividend income. This, of course, involves taxation of a)
dividends paid by domestic firms to foreign shareholders and b) taxation
of dividends received from abroad by domestic shareholders. Because the
two cannot be treated in isolation, withholding taxes collected on divi-
dends paid to foreigners, as well as corporate taxes, are considered briefly.
A. Germany (Post 1976)11
Germany is the only member of the European Common Market to provide
full relief from double taxation of dividends. It does so by employing a
hybrid system which combines a split rate with a shareholder credit. In
particular, the basic corporate tax rate is 56 percent. So far as cor-
porate income is retained, this is a final tax. If, however, such income
is distributed" the corporation receives a tax credit equal to 20 percent
of the gross income, so that the net corporate tax on distributed earnings
lS only 36 percent. The shareholder grosses up his cash dividend and(8)
takes credit for the 36 percent corporate tax imputed to him. If dividends
are paid from tax-preferred income the corporation must pay enough supplemen-
tary tax to bring the total tax rate paid at the corporate level on such
income to 36 percent. In this sense, tax preferences are nullified if pre-
ference income is distributed. But the presumptive rules for the stacking of
tax preferences are such that preference income is deemed to be the last to be
distributed and preferences tend to be preserved.
The imputation credit is available only to German shareholders in
domestic corporations. Thus German individuals who hold shares in foreign
corporations are not allowed to take advantage of imputation credits on divi-
dends received from abroad. The same is true of corporations making portfolio
investments abroad and receiving dividends. Dividends received from abroad
enter the tax base of both individuals and corporations making portfolio
investments outside Germany, but without gross-up and credit for either
foreign or domestic taxes. Credit is, however, allowed for foreign with-
holding taxes.
Profits of foreign branches and dividends received by German parent
corporations from foreign subsidiaries are either tax-exempt under tax
treaties or are taxable, but eligible for foreign corporate tax credit
against the German tax. But Germany does not recognize the foreign
corporate tax for purposes of calculating imputation credits. Rather, if
foreign-source income that has not been subject to German tax is distri-
buted, the German parent firm must pay a supplementary tax just as if it
had distributed preference income. That is, the exemption of foreign
source income and foreign tax credits are useful only to the extent thatforeign income is not distributed. Foreign source income, like preference
income, is assumed to be distributed only after all fully taxed domestic income
has been distributed. These provisions create an important incentive for
German firms (given their dividend payout policies) to have the proper mix of
fully taxed and tax preference income and of foreign and domestic income in
order to avoid liability for the supplementary tax and can therefore stimulate
industrial concentration.
In that the corporate rate is reduced to 36 per cent on distributed
earnings, dividend relief extends to that degree to all shareholders in
German firms. But the additional relief provided by the imputation cre-
dit is available only to German shareholders; it does not extend to
foreign shareholders, who must look to their countries of residence for
relief.12 The United States, for example, would allow American firms
with direct investment in German firms foreign tax credit for the unre-
lieved portion of· the German corporate tax on distributed earnings as
well as for German withholding tax.13 Individual shareholders and cor-
porate portfolio investors resident in the United States would obtain no
such relief, except for the credit for withholding tax. Rather, they
would be taxed on their net dividends from Germany without credit from
either Germany or the United States for corporate taxes paid on distri-
buted corporate earnings.
In summary, Germany does not extend the imputation credit to either
German investors in foreign firms or foreign investors in German firms.
Nor does it show any inclination to do so. It does, however, as noted
above, allow some benefit to foreign investors in Germany through thepartial use of the split rate. (The parallel question of using the
split-rate approach to provide relief to German shareholders in foreign
firms is essentially meaningless.) Finally, in tax treaties negotiated
before its 1977 adoption of full dividend relief, Germany obtained from
several countries the nonreciprocal privilege of using a 25 per cent
withholding rate on dividends so long as the differential in its two
rates of corporate tax was at least 20 per cent.14 Whether these
treaties are valid under the new system is open to debate.
B. France
France levies a 50 percent corporation income tax but allows a
shareholder credit equal to half the corporate tax paid on dividends.
When preference income is distributed, a supplementary tax equal to
the amount of the shareholder credit, called a precompte mobilier (or
simply precompte), is levied. Thus, as in the German system, tax pre-
ferences are nullified if preference income is distributed; but again pre-
ference income is assumed, in general, to be distributed after fully taxed
income.15
Like GermanYo,France does not provide imputation credits to domestic
investors in foreign corporations. Individuals and corporate portfolio
investors pay tax on net dividends received from abroad, with no relief
from double taxation (except for withholding taxes) • Foreign-source
income from direct investment is tax-exempt to the French parent. But as
in Germany, such exempt foreign-source income is treated like preference
income and subjected to the precompte if distributed.
Under French law the imputation credit is not automatically availableto foreign investors in French firms. Several French treaties do,
however, provide that the shareholder credit is available to shareholders
in treaty countries who are taxable on French dividends in their country of
residence and do not benefit from foreign tax credits for the French cor-
porate tax. In practice this means that foreign individual shareholders and
corporate portfolio investors are allowed the French imputation credit in
treaty countries, but foreign direct investors are not.
C. United Kingdom
Since returning to the imputation system in 1973 the United Kingdom
has provided relief from approximately half the double taxation of divi-
dends. (Relief is currently 33/67 of the corporate income tax.) A key
administrative feature of the British system is the advance corporation
tax or ACT. Any time a British firm pays a dividend, it must pay ACT at a
rate equal to the rate at which the imputation credit will be allowed. If
dividends are paid from taxable income, the ACT is merely credited against
the firm's corporate tax. If, however, preference income is distributed,
the ACT serves much the same purpose as the French and German precompte.
That is, it insures that shareholder credit is not allowed for taxes not
paid. But unlike those systems, under the British system it is not
necessary to have explicit rules in order to provide that preference
income is, in effect; presumed to be distributed after taxable income.
As in France and Germany, British shareholders are not allowed impu-
tation credits on dividends received from abroad. Moreover, as in
Germany, taxes paid to foreign countries by foreign subsidiaries of
British firms are ignored in application of the imputation credit. TheBritish parent receives a foreign tax credit for corporate taxes paid
abroad, but the credit is allowed only against the so-called "mainstream
corporate tax" (the net corporate tax liability after deduction of ACT);
credit cannot be taken against that part of the corporate tax offset by
ACT. Thus, as in the case of preference income, the ACT serves a purpose
similar to that of the precompte.
British legislation allows the imputation credit only to domestic
shareholders, but under double taxation treaties the credit has been
granted to foreign portfolio investors in the United Kingdom. Unlike
other countries, the United Kingdom has recently shown a reluctant
willingness to extend through treaties an imputation credit to foreign
corporate direct investors in the United Kingdom equal to one half the
credit available to domestic investors.
D. Germany (Pre-1977)
Though the predominant form of dividend relief in Europe is the impu-
tation approach, there are good reasons for believing that an alternative
approach is superior on at least some grounds. This approach involves
allowing corporations a deduction for dividends paid or, what is equiva-
lent, applying a different rate to retained and distributed corporate-
source income. Though Germany retains a split rate in conjunction with
its imputation credit system, a better example of this alternative
approach is the system used in Germany before 1977. Under that system a
tax of 15 percent was levied on income used to pay dividends but retained
income was subject to a rate of 51 percent.16Dividend relief provided through the split-rate system automatically
extends to foreign shareholders in domestic firms. Germany was, however,
as mentioned above, able partially to ameliorate this disadvantage (and
avoid the Auslaendereffekt mentioned in footnote 14 above) by negotiating
nonreciprocal withholding rates with some of its treaty partners.
Dissatisfaction with the automaticity of the relief provided to foreigners
and American recalcitrance against more general use of nonreciprocal with-
holding rates were among the reasons for the German shift to primary
reliance on the imputation approach as a means of providing dividend
relief.
The split-rate system does not lend itself to the mitigation of
double taxation of dividends received from abroad. Dividends on foreign
portfolio investments were therefore taxed to German shareholders, with no
relief from the foreign corporate tax. (The lower rate of tax was, of
course, applied to redistributed earnings of corporate portfolio
investors.) Dividends from foreign subsidiaries were ordinarily ~xempt;
in such a case the lower rate of tax was not applied to earnings redistri-
buted by the parent•. Where not exempt under treaty, dividends on foreign
direct investment were fully taxed to German parents, though the double
tax burden would be reduced by foreign tax credit.
E. The E. E. C. Draft Directive
The twists and turns taken by proposals for harmonizing company taxes
in the European Economic Community are rather incredible.17 The Neumark
Committee proposed that harmonization be based on a split-rate approach.
Then van den Tempel, placing heavy weight on international considerations,(14)
proposed that member countries employ a "classical system" (and perhaps
coined the term in the process). Most recently, the Commission of the
European Communities based its proposal for harmonization on the imputa-
tion approach. Given that this last proposal has not been accepted, one
can only guess what will be proposed next. It seems worthwhile, however,
to summarize and appraise the approach recommended in the 1975 draft direc-
tive.
The draft directive can be described as patterned closely after the
French approach to dividend relief. That is, it provides that all members
of the European Economic Community would levy corporate income taxes at
rates varying from 45 to 55 percent and that between 45 and 55 percent of
the corporate tax burden on income distributed to shareholders would be
removed through the use of a gross-up and credit. A precompte or advance
corporation tax would be used to prevent shareholders from taking credit
for taxes not paid at the corporate level. Rules similar to those
employed in France would be used to determine the presumptive order of
sources of income from which dividends are paid for purposes of deter-
mining liability for precompte.
Under the scheme for dividend relief proposed in the draft directive
the imputation credit would be based on the tax rate paid in the source
country. This would be achieved by having the distributing company pro-
vide individual and corporate portfolio shareholders with vouchers stating
the amount of tax credit attached to dividends received. The shareholder
would submit this voucher with his tax return in his country of residence in
order to claim credit. The fiscal authority of theshareholder's state of residence would collect from the treasury of the
country of residence of the corporation paying dividends the amount indi-
cated on vouchers for which it had given shareholders credit.
Under the draft directive parent firms receiving dividends from sUb-
sidiaries would not pay tax on such dividends; nor would they be able to
claim imputation credit for corporate taxes paid by the subsidiary. As
under other European imputation schemes currently in existence, distribu-
tion of tax-free income would ordinarily trigger liability for precompte
or ACT. But when tax~free dividends received from subsidiaries were
redistributed by the parent firm, the imputation credit "attached to"
such dividends could be used to offset the parent's precompte or ACT. Of
course, the parent company's shareholders would take the normal share-
holder credit that accompanies dividends. As a result, the source
country would obtain revenues from taxes levied on income retained by the
subsidiary and on income distributed to the parent but retained there. But
through a "clearing house" arrangement similar to that described above
for portfolio dividends, it would bear the fiscal cost of integrating its tax
into the imputation system of the country of residence of the parent.18
IV. OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
Economists often appraise fiscal relations on the basis of equity and
neutrality. Though complicated enough in a closed economy context, appli-
cation of these concepts is particularly difficult in the international sphere.
This section describes several norms by which international fiscal rela-
tions can be judged. In addition, two concepts which are more or less(16)
unique to the international area are described. Finally, ease of compliance
and administration is taken to be an important goal, through it is seldom
discussed explicitly.
Economists commonly place economic neutrality high on their list of
objectives for tax policy, because if certain stringent conditions are met
a neutral tax system can be expected to result in the maximization of
welfare.19 Of course, in the international arena when one discusses
maximization of welfare, it is necessary to decide whose welfare is to
"count" in the maximization. Maximization of world economic welfare
(sometimes called worldwide efficiency) can be achieved when taxes do not
distort the allocation of capital between countries, that is, when taxes
exhibit capital-export neutrality. Under a classical system, capital-
export neutrality is usually said ,to be achieved either if the source
country exempts corporate income from tax or if the country of residence
of shareholders allows a foreign tax credit for corporate taxes paid to
other countries.20 'In either event foreign-source income IID.lst be taxed
by the residence country as it is earned, rather than merely when
repatriated, if capital-export neutrality is to be achieved.
Analyzing capital-export neutrality from the perspective of a classi-
cal system is basically inconsistent with the intellectual foundation of
integration, under which the corporation is seen only as a conduit through
which income passes to its ultimate recipients, the shareholders of the
corporation. Thus in what follows capital-export neutrality is judged
from an integrationist viewpoint. That is, aggregate corporate and per-
sonal liabilities are considered in determining whether foreign anddomestic investments are taxed equally.
The welfare of a capital exporting country is maximized if the total
return to the country, including tax revenue, is independent of where
investment is made. In a classical system such a condition, often
referred to as national efficiency, is said to be achieved if the resi-
dence country allows deduction of foreign taxes in calculating taxable
income. Because capital-export neutrality involves equal net (after-tax)
returns in all countries and national efficiency requires equal gross
returns, the two principles are generally inconsistent. Capital-import
neutrality is also generally inconsistent with integration and dividend
relief that extends to foreign-source income.
Capital-import neutrality occurs if all capital invested in the same
country is taxed ident,ically. While this concept appeals to many busi-
nessmen, it has little attraction from the point of view of welfare maximiza-
tion. In a sense, it is the opposite of capital-export neutrality. It can be
achieved in a classical system if capital importing nations allow credit for
taxes paid in residence countries or if capital exporting countries exempt
foreign-source income. It, too, is inconsistent with integration and dividend
relief.
Tax equity among persons involves questions of both the equality of
taxation of given types of income at a given income level and systematic
differences in tax rates levied across income levels. If horizontal
interpersonal equity is defined only in terms of taxes levied by the
taxpayer's country of residence (national equity), it is governed by the
same considerations as is national efficiency. If, on the other hand,(18)
equity is defined in terms of taxes imposed by foreign countries, as well
as the taxpayer's country of residence (international equity), it is
governed by the same factors as capital-export neutrality. In either
event, interpersonal equity need not be discussed further.
In addition to questions of interpersonal equity, and perhaps more
important for the present discussion, are those of intercountry equity.
These involve international division of income, including the division of
tax revenues between national treasuries.21 Though questions of the divi-
sion of revenues among source countries may be as important as those of the
distribution of revenues between countries of source and residence, we con-
centrate on the latter. The definition of this type of international
fiscal equity depends upon several factors, including relative levels of
per capita income and levels and types of public services. If, for
example, one country provided substantial benefits to corporations but
another did not, it would seem appropriate that the first should receive a
relatively larger share of revenues from taxes on corporate income than the
second. Similarly, most would feel that some degree of redistribution from
rich to poor countries might be justified. Moreover, it can be argued that
countries with substantial natural resources have a right to revenues from
exploitation of such resources. Finally, if one country is a heavy net
debtor and the other an equally heavy net creditor the distribution of tax
revenues will depend crucially on the split of tax revenues between
countries of source and residence.
Two important principles guiding tax treaty negotiations have been
nondiscrimination and reciprocity. Under the first of these, hostcountries cannot discriminate in the taxation of domestic and foreign
firms. The second requires that withholding rates should be "mirror
images" of those applied by treaty partners. Taken together, these two
conventions place countries using split rates at a severe disadvantage
relative to those with classical systems. In the extreme case a country
,(ith a split-rate system of full dividend relief might collect only a 15
percent withholding tax on income distributed to American shareholders
whereas the United States would collect the 46 percent corporate income tax
s.nd a 15 percent withholding tax on the gross distribution from the net
income of 54. Whether these rules, which have developed in a world of
classical tax systems, are appropriate in a world of dividend relief is
hotly debated. Advocates of "effective reciprocity" argue that the total
(corporate and withholding) tax burden levied on corporate income in the
source country should be the basis for determining whether reciprocity is
realized.22
V. INTERNATIONAL APPRAISAL OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR DIVIDEND RELIEF23
If we ignore full integration as being administratively infeasible
and treat the split-rate and dividend-paid deduction systems as equiva-
lent, we can imagine three approaches to the taxation of corporate-source
income: a classical system, a split-rate regime, and an imputation
approach, and six alternative combinations of fiscal systems between two
trading partners (classical with classical, classical with imputation,
etc.). Moreover, international investment in corporations can be imple-
mented in at least four distinct ways: individual portfolio investment,
corporate portfolio investment, corporate direct investment in foreign sub-(20)
sidiaries~ and corporate direct investment in foreign branches. To attempt
to examine systematically the tax treatment of each type of investment for
each of the pairs of tax systems would be unmanageable~ even if we were to
ignore international differences in definitions of income~ the treatment
of tax preferences~ and the degree of dividend relief. In what follows
we therefore limit consideration primarily to individual portfolio
investment in foreign shares and corporate direct investment in foreign
subsidiaries. Morover~ we devote primary attention to a comparison of
two means of providing dividend relief employed in both nations: a
split-rate system and an imputation approach. Subsequently problems
created by the coexistance of systems of dividend relief and a classical
system are considered briefly in Section VII.
One principle is absolutely clear. Dividend relief must be based
upon taxes collected in the country of source~ rather than on the tax rate
in the country of residence of shareholders~ if capital-export neutrality
is to be achieved. If it is not~ relief will generally be either too great or
too small~ and exactly correct only by accident. This being the case~ foreign
investment in high-tax countries would be discouraged and that in low-tax
countries would be stimulated artificially; in either event~ capital export
neutrality would not be achieved. As explained below, administrative con-
siderations suggest that relief should be provided initially by the source
country in the case of portfolio investors; for direct investment relief pro-
vided by the country of residence of the parent may be more appropriate. Which
country bears the fiscal cost of dividend relief could, it seems~ be a separate
question.A. Portfolio Investment
Except in a very simple world without tax preferences, it would be c~
bersome, and perhaps impossible, for residence countries to provide imputa-
tion credits based on taxes paid to source countries, without assistance
from source countries. While the source country's statutory rate could be
used by the residence country to calculate grosH-up and credit in the
absence of tax preferences, its use generally produces neither exact pass-
through of preferences nor exact nullification of preferences. Nor can
effective rates generally be used satisfactorily to nullify preferences.
Only if a precompte is levied on distributed preference income will gross-up
and credit based on the statutory rate result in washout of preferences.
And to achieve pass-through of preferences, taxable income and exempt income
must be reported separately, with only the former being subject to gross-up
and credit. Moreover, tax credits must be reported separately so the share-
holder can utilize them on his personal return. It is generally not
possible to provide this information to shareholders accurately on a timely
basis. (See McLure, 1978 and forthcoming, 1979, Chapter 4.)
The first questions, then, are whether preferences are to be passed
through or nUllified, the order in which preference and taxable income is
assumed to be distributed, and which country is to make these decisions. In
most cases it seems that the source. country is in command. It determines
whether or not to nullify preferences when it either levies a precompte or
does not, and it would be difficult for the residence country to levy a pre-
compte or use a variable-rate gross-up and credit based on source-countrytaxes. Moreover, since the distributing corporation is under the fiscal
control of the source country, there seems to be no way the residence
country could apply any stacking rules besides those of the source country.
Similarly, if the source country does not require separate reporting of
taxable income, exempt income, and credits, there is no way the residence
country could pass through source-country credits, and trying to allow
residence-country credits in such a case seems ridiculous. In short, the
treatment of preferences must be determined by the source country.
Dividend relief based on source-country taxation is provided automati-
cally by the dividend-paid deduction and split-rate systems. It could be
achieved, though not so easily, if the source country provided imputation
credits to foreign shareholders. One potentially useful approach would be
that incorporated in the E.E.C. draft directive. That is, the country of
residence of portfolio shareholders would allow credits for foreign cor-
porate taxes paid based on vouchers issued by the foreign firm; it would
then be reimbursed by the source country for amounts shown on the vouchers.
Because it would stand to suffer the revenue loss entailed by falsified
vouchers, the source country would have the incentive, as well as being in a
better position, to scrutinize vouchers issued to shareholders by domestic
firms. (It might even be thought worthwhile for the source-country fiscal
authorities to certify the validity of vouchers in advance.)
Under such an approach the proper treatment of tax preferences becomes
an interesting issue. In the absence of preferences complete dividend
relief based on source-country taxes would result in capital-export(23)
neutrality~ at least so far as distributed income is concerned.24 But
if tax preferences existed~ the achievement of capital-export neutrality
would depend on the treatment of preference income.25 In particular~
if both countries allowed identical preferences and stacked them in the
same way~ but one country passed preferences through and the other Washed
them out~ capital-export neutrality would not generally be achieved.26
Similarly~ if both countries treated preference income deemed to be
distributed identically~ but had different stacking rules~ capital-export
neutrality would generally be violated. If~ for example~ both countries
passed preferences through~ less tax would be paid on dividend income
originating in the country that stacks preferences first. If~ on the
other hand~ preferences were washed out in both countries~ taxation of
dividends would be independent. of the the stacking rules applied. But in
both these cases retained earnings would be taxed differently in the two
countries.27 Finally~ if whatever tax preferences existed were treated
identically in the two countries~ but different preferences were allowed
in the two countries~ capital-export neutrality would generally be
destroyed~ and the arguments above apply a fortiori if all the potential
differences mentioned above exist simultaneously.
It might be thought that this problem arises because foreign and
domestic. investors are treated identically by the source country ~ whereas
capital-export neutrality requires that treatment be equal across
domestic investors. It might appear adequate for the achievement of
capital-export neutrality~ for example~ to pass preferences through to
domestic shareholders but wash them out on dist~ibutions to foreigners.(24)
But besides being difficult to administer and blatantly discriminatory,
such an approach would win only half of the battle; it would also be
necessary to pass the same preferences through to domestic shareholders in
foreign firms - a clearly nonsensical idea. This makes it clear that tax
preferences allowed domestic investors to stimulate domestic saving are
consistent with capital-export neutrality, whereas preferences to stimulate
domestic investment are not. Given the prevalence of tax preferences
intended to stimulate investment, the prospects for a system which is truly
neutral with regard to capital export look bleak. To the extent that pre-
ferences are stacked last and washed out on distribution, as they commonly
are in Europe, the interference with capital-export neutrality in the taxa-
tion of dividends may be rather minimal. But differences in taxation of
retained preference income are potentially quite non-neutral.
Two issues remain to be discussed: partial dividend relief and the
division of the fiscal cost of dividend relief. To the extent that
relief is only partial, because a deduction is allowed for only part of
dividends, because the split-rate applied to distributed income is not
zero, or because the gross-up and credit is less than the corporate tax
attributed to dividends, the income taxes are not integrated for distri-
buted earnings. Capital-export neutrality generally will not be realized,
even for distributed earnings, if corporate tax rates or the extent of
dividend relief differ across countries. This is discussed further in sec-
tion VI.
If portfolio investment is roughly balanced between countries and
rates of return and corporate tax rates are comparable across countries,it makes relatively little difference whether the source or residence
country provides dividend relief. If, however, investment is not balanced
it can be expected that capital-importing countries would object to an
arrangement under which they provided dividend relief, as under the
scheme outlined above, and bore its fiscal cost. Thus whether the source
country reimbursed the residence country completely for credits claimed
on vouchers originating in the source country would seem to be a reason-
able topic for negotiation. Certainly in fiscal relations with developing
countries it might be deemed appropriate that developed countries should
bear a relatively large share of the fiscal cost as source countries, but
not a correspondingly small share as residence countries. To the extent
that dividend relief is partial, this discussion would apply only to the
extent that "integration" is achieved. On the part of dividends subject
to double taxation, as well as on retained earnings, the source country
would obtain all revenue from the corporate tax.
B. Direct Investment
Where direct investment through subsidiaries is concerned, the proper
solution is not nearly so clear as in the case of portfolio investment.
Suppose that both source and residence countries have split~rate or divi-
dend-paid deduction systems. If the SUbsidiary's earnings are not taxed
to the parent until they are distributed to it, the subsidiary's retained
earnings bear tax at the rate prevailing in the source country.
Dividends paid to the parent would be taxed only at the rates applicable
in the country of residence of the parent. Earnings distributed by the
parent would not be taxed at the corporate level, but would bear tax at the(26)
marginal rate of individual shareholders. Income retained by the parent
would be taxed as such in the parent's country of residence. Though at
first glance this solution seems reasonable enough, further examination
reveals a serious flaw.28 Suppose that the foreign subsidiary in this
example is owned by a parent (or first-level subsidiary) chartered in a tax
haven country. In such a case income distributed by the subsidiary and
retained by the parent would go tax-free and we would have in accentuated
form the "Auslaendereffekt" familiar from previous experience with the
old German split-rate system. The same problem could occur if both
countries employed the imputation system and the source country provided
the imputation credits for tax paid by the subsidiary.
Among closely associated countries, such as those of the European
Common Market, an approach such as that proposed for direct investment
under the E.E.C. draft directive might provide a workable solution, and
such an approach might even be followed in bilateral tax treaties with
other countries. But, as will be noted more fully in Section VI, this
approach may not be workable if either degrees of dividend relief or cor-
porate tax rates are not equal between two countries. Thus an alter-
native solution may need to be found, at least for relations·outside the
E.E.C.
One possible solution under the imputation approach would be for
source countries to differentiate between direct investment through sub-
sidiaries and portfolio investment, with the burden of providing dividend
relief being left to the country of residence of the parent in the former
case. This result could be achieved if a) imputation credits otherwiseprovided by the source country were denied foreign direct investors and b)
the residence country allowed credit for the corporation income tax of the
source country, without nullifying the credit when foreign source income
was distributed. In the case of wholly-owned subsidiaries denial of the
preferential rate for dividends paid to parents in a split-rate system
would be the equivalent of provision (a); where subsidiaries are less than
wholly owned the denial of the benefit of the split rate would presumably
be shared by other stockholders in the subsidiary. Its effects could, in
principle, be duplicated by a special withholding tax on distributions to
parent firms.29
The denial of imputation credits to foreign direct investors is, of
course, standard. But the equivalent denial of the preferential rate on
dividends paid abroad, or the application of special withholding taxes on
such dividends, conflicting as it does with the principle of reciprocity,
has been fought bitterly, especially by the United States, and is not
common. Nor have countries of residence of parent firms been willing to
integrate foreign corporate taxes into their own individual income taxes.
Rather, they have used the precompte to reverse foreign tax credits on
foreign-source income redistributed by parents.
Under the scheme outlined above, relief from double taxation of divi-
dends, though based on tax paid in the source country, would be provided by
the residence country. This has important implications for the division of
revenues between source and residence countries; as in the case of port-
folio investment, international arrangements for the sharing of fiscal costs
might be in order.(28)
In the absence of tax preferences the approach described above would
result in capital-export neutrality, at least for distributed earning. In
a more realistic case, it would not. Tax preferences would be available to
the parent firm so far as domestic income was retained; for distributed
earnings domestic preferences could be passed through to shareholders or
nullified, but the latter approach seems more likely.
In the absence of special provisions that seem to be politically
unlike~, the approach outlined earlier would result in tax preferences
available in the source country being washed out to the extent that pre-
ference income was distributed by the foreign subsidiary to the parent
firm.30 (To the extent that the source country followed common European
practice, this would be of little consequence; preferences are ordinarily
washed out via a precompte in the source country when distributed.) Thus,
leaving aside differences in the basic corporate tax rates applied to
retaine4 corporate source income and differences in the availability of
preferences in the. two countries, we see that preferences would remain
intact on income retained by the source-country SUbsidiary and on domestic
income retained by the parent firm. They would be nullified on income
distributed by the subsidiary, including that retained by the parent, and
probab~ on domestic income distributed by the parent. It appears unlikely
that capital-export neutrality would be achieved. As was noted above, so
long as preferences are based on investment, rather than on saving, capital
export neutrality cannot generally be achieved.3l(29)
VI. HARMONIZATION IN THE COMMON ~WffiKET
If all European countries had similar rates of corporate tax and
similar degrees of dividend relief, the methods of dealing with dividends
crossing international borders proposed in the E.E.C. draft directive
would be quite reasonable. It is consistent with the principle announced
in the previous section that dividend relief must be based on taxes paid
in the source country. (But if all corporate tax rates were similar,
adherence to this principle would be relatively unimportant.) Moreover,
the approach suggested seems to be a sensible means of dealing with the
problem posed by dividends paid to parents by subsidiaries.
If, however, either corporate tax rates or degrees of dividend
relief differ significantly between member countries, the approach
suggested in the draft directive is severely deficient. That this is
true is evidenced by Germany's refusal to approve the draft directive.
Germany, as noted above, is the only member country of the E. E. C. which
currently provides full relief from double taxation of dividends.
A. Portfolio investment
The problem posed by unequal corporate tax rates or degrees of divi-
dend relief is easily seen. Suppose first that corporate rates are
equal, but that different degrees of dividend relief are allowed.32 In
such a case the country with the more fully integrated tax system would
be providing more relief for foreign shareholders in domestic firms than
its own shareholders in foreign firms were receiving. Besides the reve-
nue cost to the country providing more complete dividend relief, such an
approach would violate capital export neutrality. Portfolio investors inboth countries would be encouraged to invest in the country providing
greater dividend relief. Of course, some countries might find the capi-
tal inflow stimulated by this distortion attractive and perhaps worth the
revenue loss it would entail, but those losing potential investment would
probably object.
If tax rates in member countries are different, the situation can be
even worse, unless all countries provide full dividend relief. (If divi-
dend relief is complete, the corporate tax rate cannot matter, except for
retained earnings.) Suppose that all countries in the E.E.C. allow
shareholder credits for half their corporate taxes, but that corporate
tax rates differ substantially. Portfolio investment in high-tax
countries would be discouraged because of the differences in aggregate
taxation of distributed earnings, as well as because of those on retained
earnings. The combination of unequal corporate tax rates and unequal
degrees of dividen.d relief would create complicated counterforces about
which generalization is difficult. But so far as portfolio investment is
concerned it appears essential to the success of any effort toward har-
monization that effect.ive corporate tax rate and the extent of dividend
relief be similar across countries.
B. Direct investment
Because the draft directive's approach for direct investment is
based on exemption for foreign-source income that is not distributed by
the parent, rather than on the use of a foreign tax credit, it is more
nearly consistent with capital-import neutrality than with capital-export
neutrality. Of course, if all income were distributed by subsidiaries andredistributed by parents and all countries allowed full relief from double
taxation of dividends, capital-export neutrality would be achieved. But
failure to achieve capital-export neutrality would occur to the extent
that income retained by either subsidiaries or parents was effectively
taxed at different source-country rates. As is the case of portfolio
investment, harmonization of corporate rates seems essential.
Given the constraints just described an approach such as that of
Section V may be preferable to that outlined in the draft directive.
Under it, to review, double taxation of portfolio dividends would be
relieved much as under the draft directive. But residence countries,
rather than source countries, would provide dividend relief for direct
investment. -Besides requiring more complete crediting of foreign taxes,
this approach would require that precompte not be levied when foreign-
source income is distributed by the parent firm.33
VII. EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
If the United States decided to adopt dividend relief, it would need
to work out new international fiscal relations with other countries. If
those countries already allowed dividend relief, the discussion of Section
V would be relevant. But the U.S. would also confront countries that
retained classical systems. This is, of course, basically the position in
which European countries find themselves in dealing with the United
States.34 For this reason, as well as for the intrinsic independent
interest of the subject, it is worthwhile to consider fiscal relations bet-
ween the U.S. and Europe.The United States, with it classical system, is the extreme version
of a country providing a low degree of dividend relief. Experience has
shown that the United States will not gladly acquiesce in the denial of
shareholder credits to its residents on foreign portfolio investment.
But countries following common European practice (the approach outlined in
the draft directive) of extending the shareholder credit for its cor-
porate tax to American portfolio investors can expect an inflow of port-
folio investment and a corresponding revenue 10ss.35
So far as direct investment through European subsidiaries of American
parents is concerned, there may be somewhat more latitude for nego-
tiations, since the United States has wrung agreement to shareholder
credits for dividends paid to American parents from only the United Kingdom.
Here the incentives are much more lopsided than in the case of portfolio
investment, for there may be a substantial revenue loss to the European
treasuries, but perhaps little stimulus to capital inflow. The incentive
for capital inflows to take advantage of the tax credit does not occur
because much of the benefit of dividend relief accrues to the U.S.
Treasury through reduced foreign tax credits, rather than to American
investors. It thus seems likely that European countries are forced to con-
tinue to deny the imputation credit to direct investment from the United
States even if they allow the credit to portfolio investors.
Lacking any provisions for dividend relief, the United States does
not allow any imputation credits for European investors in the United States.
Thus there is no corresponding revenue transfer from America to European
investors or to European fiscs. And since European imputation credits arenot allowed European portfolio investors for corporate taxes paid in
America - a practice which, for good reason, no country has chosen to
follow - capital export neutrality is commonly violated in Europe. But
through the substitution of a foreign tax credit where exemption is pre-
sently used, capital-export neutrality could be achieved on foreign direct
investment.
Given the environment in which the question is asked, there is no
simple answer to whether a given European country should provide dividend
relief and how much relief it should provide. So long as the United States
maintains a classical system it will be difficult for any other country to
adopt a system of dividend relief that is totally satisfactory. Yet the
case for dividend relief is strong, even in countries that are small and
open to capital f16Ws.36
American intransigence on the question of mirror-image withholding
rates may rule out use of the split-rate and dividend-paid deduction
approaches to dividend relief. Even worse, if the United States decided
to argue in treaty negotiations that failure to provide shareholder
credits to American direct investors constituted a de facto withholding tax,
all European countries using the imputation approach might find it
necessary to renegotiate tax treaties with the United States. If the
European Economic Community were to negotiate collectively, progress
might be ma~e against the American position. This appears to be
appropriate since, as argued earlier, it seems that residence countries
should be responsible for dividend relief on direct investment. If,however, a single small European country were to try to negotiate alone
against the United States, it would have considerable difficulty.
Even if the American influence on the issue could be ignored, the
future of dividend relief in the European Economic Community is far from
clear. The primary problem is that the same amount of dividend relief is
not provided in all countries. One can imagine blocs developing within
the Common Market based on the extent of dividend relief allowed in
various countries. Those countries providing relief from roughly half
the corporate income tax on distributed earnings could agree to implement
the provisions of the draft directive on a bilateral or multilateral
basis. But so might other countries join with Germany in a similar
arrangement based on complete relief from double taxation of dividends.Footnotes
*A slightly different version of this paper was prepared for a con-
ference at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, November 24, 1978. This paper is
related to NBER programs of research on Business Taxation and Finance and
on International Studies and to the Bureau's special project on Capital
Formation. It has not undergone review by the Board of Directors of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
lThroughout this paper the term "integration" is used to refer to
tax schemes under which the entire income of a eorporationwould be attri-
buted to shareholders and taxed to the latter ~; the marginal tax rates
applicable to them, whether distributed or retained. By comparison,
"dividend relief" extends the concept of integration only to distributed
corporate-source e~uity income. That is, distributed income is free of
corporate tax and is taxed only to the shareholder; so far as retained
earnings are concerned the corporation income tax remains a final tax, as
in a classical or unintegrated system. "Dividend relief" is meant to be
descriptive, rather than pejorative; it allows one to avoid such ambiguous
terms as "partial integration" and the monstrous "partial partial
integration," which is sometimes used to refer to systems of partial divi-
dend relief.
2Some further definition of terms may be in order. A "classical"
system is one in which corporate-source inCOlue is taxed to the firm anddividends are a component of the taxable income of shareholders; at most
modest efforts are made to relieve double taxation of dividends. Under
the "imputation" system the corporate income tax is treated as a with-
holding tax to the extent it is levied on corporate source income
resulting in dividends. It is therefore imputed to the shareholder and
included in his income for tax purposes; a shareholder credit is then
allowed for the tax imputed to the shareholder. Under full integration, if
the corporate tax is retained it is only as a withholding device. Under a
"split-rate" system a lower rate is applied to distributed corporate source
income than to such income which is retained. It is equivalent to a
"dividend-paid deduction," under which the corporation pays tax only on
income which is retained. In both of the last two systems the shareholder
simply includes cash dividends in his income for tax purposes, as under the
classical system. For further elaboration of these systems, see McLure
30ne must, however, have considerable sympathy with the following
statement from Bird(1975, p.3l4):
"What has been done in other countries, or what may be done there in
the future, is really not very relevant to what must or should be
done in the United States. References to foreign experiences, when
they support a position one has adopted for other reasons are stan-
dards (sic) tactics for any good advocate; but this does hot mean they
are relevent•. Given the degree of observed flexibility and adapt-
ability which the international econornlf has demonstrated in recent
years, any argument that a minor change in tax structure will have a
major or irreversible impact on international capital flows does not
carry much weight. In this, as in other areas, the United States is
more or less free to make its own mistakes."
4For a discussion of the supposed advantages and disadvantages of
integration and dividend relief, see McLure (forthcoming, 1979 chapter 2).On the administrative feasibility of integration and dividend relief, see
McLure (forthcoming, 1979, Chapter 5) and, for a more condensed summary,
McLure (1978).
5For an excellent exposition of the administrative difficulties of
integration and dividend relief dating from the early post-war period, see
Goode(1946).
6It is sometimes thought that the distributional and neutrality
advantages of full integration could be achieved without incurring the
substantial administrative burden involved in integration if dividend
relief were combined with a reduction of the top personal tax rate to the
level of the corporate rate. According to this argument, no shareholder
would have a tax incentive to prefer retained earnings over dividends and
most would have fiscal reasons to prefer dividends. If these incentives
were strong enough; all corporate income would be distributed and there-
fore taxed only at the marginal tax rates of individuals, as under full
integration. There are, however, several flaws in this argument. First,
one important attraction of full integration, neutrality toward corporate
financial policy, would be sacrificed. Second, if tax preferences were
treated as in Europe (assumed to be the last element of income distributed
but subject to a supplementary tax on distribution), it is most unlikely
that distribution of corporate source-income would be complete, because the
cost of dividends in terms of sacrificed retained earnings would be too
high. Third, if dividend relief is partial, rather than complete, the
incentives to distribution just described might not be strong enough to
insure complete payout.7Tax preferences can be defined as any provisions which reduce tax
liability to less than it would be if the standard corporate tax rate were
applied to economic income of the corporation. Preferences can be deduc-
tions which artificially reduce taxable income to below economic income,
preferential rates, and credits which further reduce tax calculated by
applying actual rates to taxable income. Understanding of the European
discussion of tax preferences is hindered by barriers of language and must
depend in large part on descriptions provided by Gourevitch (1977).
8For further discussion of alternative ways of treating tax pre-
ferences under integration and dividend relief, see Warren (1977) and
McLure (forthcoming, 1979, Chapter 4).
9For a more detailed discussion of these political cross-currents
see McLure and Surrey (1977).
lOFor more detailed descriptions, see Ault (1976), Au1t (1977),
Hammer (1975), OECD (1973), Sato and Bird (1975), Snoy (1975), and McLure
(forthcoming, 1979, chapter 3).
llFor further details on the German system, see Au1t (1976).
l2Relief is allowed foreign shareholders for the 36 percent cor-
porate tax so far as it is foreign source income that is distributed.
l3The American foreign tax credit does not extend to German tax
attributed to income retained by the German subsidiary because under
United States law taxon such income is deferred until dividends are paid.
l4Germany was unsuccessful in negotiating such a provision with the
United States, which demanded reciprocal 15 percent withholding rates. TheUnited States does) however) allow application of the 25 percent rate
where profits of German subsidiaries distributed to American parents
are reinvested in Germany) in order to prevent the "Auslaendereffekt".
This effect occurs when dividends paid to foreigners) being taxed at the
preferential German rate on distributed income and then reinvested in
Germany) are subject to lower taxation than income retained by a German
corporation. For further discussion of this effect see Biehl and
Juettemeier (1976).
15In fact) dividends paid from income earned more than four years
earlier are treated as preference income.
It may be worthwhile to point out an important definitional question
which arises if dividend relief is not complete. In the German system
nullification of tax preferences is unambiguous. The supplementary
tax brings the effective tax rate paid on all distributed preference
income up to the statutory 36 percent rate applied to ordinary taxable
corporate income and allowed as a shareholder credit. Under the French
system of partial dividend relief the precompte equals the shareholder
credit) but not the rate of tax levied on ordinary corporate income.
Thus in France preferences are nullified in the sense that no credit is
given for taxes not paid; but they are not nullified in that they are not
taxed like ordinary income.
16The income used to pay the tax on distributed earnings was sub-
j ect to the tax on retained income. Because of this "shadow effect" the
total rate of tax applied to income resulting in dividends was actually
23.5 percent.(40)
Dividend income received from subsidiaries was exempt to the parent
firm, if it was redistributed by the parent. If such income was retained
by the parent a 36 percent supplementary tax called the "Nachsteuer" was
levied to bring the total rate of tax up to the 51 percent rate applied to
retentions.
l7See Neumark Report (1963), van den Tempel (1970), and Commission
of the European Communities (1975).
l8If the shareholder credit in the nation of the distributing parent
firm exceeded the credit for taxes paid to the country of residence of the
subsidiary, precompte or ACT would be collected from the parent; if, on the
other hand, the credit available from the source country exceeded that
allowed shareholders, no adjustment would be made.
19 These conditions are, of course, not actually met. But it
is fairly certain that satisfying the conditions for neutrality described
below would produce higher welfare for the target group than would a tax
system involving substantial distortions. Beyond that, various concepts of
neutrality have advocates whose support is not conditional upon satisfac-
tion of the conditions for welfare maximization.
20The requirement that foreign tax credit be allowed for foreign
taxes is totally unrealistic in the case of portfolio investment. For a
discussion of several reasons why foreign tax credits may not result in
capital export neutrality, even in the case of direct parent-subsidiary
investment, see Hufbauer (1975). For a further discussion of neutrality
in international fiscal relations, see Musgrave (1969). At this point we
abstract from benefits of public services rendered to corporations.(41)
Strictly speaking~ the argument in the text and those which follow apply
only to the extent that taxes exceed the value of public services pro-
vided to corporations.
21For a more complete discussion of issues of equity~ see Musgrave
and Musgrave (1972).
22See Sato and Bird (1975).
23The discussion in the remainder of the paper relies heavily on
Ault (1978) and McLure (forthcoming~ chapter 6).
24Complete capital-export neutrality would be achieved only if
retained corporate earnings were taxed identically in the two countries.
25It is assumed that under the imputation method a precompte would
be used if preferences were to be washed out; for the reasons~ which are
even more compelling in the present case~ see ~~Lure (forthcoming~ 1979~
Chapter 4~) and McLure (1978).
26An important exception is~ of course~ the case in which prefer-
ences are stacked last and no dividends are deemed to be paid from
preference income. Given the assumed difference in treatment of preference
income and the implied incentives to retain and distribute preference
income~ it is unlikely that preference income would~ in fact~ be left
equally untouched by distribution policy in the two countries. For more on
these incentives~ see McLure (forthcoming~ 1979~ Chapter 4).
27This argument can~ of course~ be turned around in the case of
both countries passing preferences through. In that case retained ear-
nings will generally be taxed differently in the two countries. This helps
to emphasize how deficient an analysis of capital-export neutrality is if(42)
it ignores the treatment of retained earnings. But any system short of
full integration in all countries is generally doomed to be non-neutral.
28For further elaboration, see McLure (forthcoming, chapter 5) and
Sato and Bird (1975).
29Such withholding taxes, together with the corporate tax, should
be governed by "effective reciprocity" in the opinion of Sato and Bird
30It is assumed here that the country of residence of the parent
would require reporting of profits without benefit of foreign tax pre-
ferences.
31Contrary to the suggestion in Bird (1975), elimination of
deferral would not produce capital-export neutrality if preferences of
the subsidiary and those applicable to the parents' domestic income were
treated differently.
32It seems likely that the currently common practice of washing
out tax preferences on distribution would continue, since it is sanc-
tioned by the draft directive and there appears to be no tendency to
deviate from it. Of course, differences in preferences could still
distort the allocation of capital within the E.E.C., even if they were
available only on retained ea.rnings. These differences can be subsumed
under differences in corporate rates, to be discussed below.
33For an assessment that agrees in part with that presented here
see Bird (1975, p. 313).
34Among the reasons the analogy is not total are a) Europe is facing
a large country with a classical system; the U.S. would not; b) its pasttreaties tend to lock the U.S. into an inflexible position on reciprocity
and non-discrimination; other countries with classical systems would
probably have more lattitude.
35This capital inflow might be small, given American reluctance to
make foreign portfolio investments.
36This view may appear to be inconsistent with that expressed,
for example, in McLure (1978), that dividend relief may appropriately be
delayed until administrative problems are resolved. Among the differences
that account for this apparent inconsistency are a) the United States is
not involved in an economic community with countries providing dividend
relief and b) tax preferences are said to be less prevalent in Europe
than in the United States.(44)
References
Ault, Hugh J., "Germany: The New Corporation Tax System," Intertax,
1976/8, pp. 262-75.
Ault, Hugh J., "International Issues in Corporate Tax Integration,"
Law and POliC~ in International Business, vol. 10, no. 2
(1978), pp. 4 1-94.
Biehl, Dieter and Juettemeier, Karl-Heinz, "German Experience with an
Integrated Corporate Shareholder Tax System," a report to the
Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury Department, 1976.
Bird, Richard M., "International Aspects of Integration," National Tax
Journal," Vol.28 (Septemebr 1975), pp.302-14.
Commission of the European Communities, "Proposal for a Directive of the
Council Concerning the Harmonization of Company Taxation and of
Witholding Taxes on Dividends," reproducted in European Taxation,
Vo1.16 (February-April,1976), pp.52-121.
Goode, Richard, The Postwar Cor oration Tax Structure (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1946 •
U. S• Government
Hammer, Richard M.; "The Taxation of Income from Corporate Shareholders:
Review of Present Systems in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and
the U.K.," National Tax Journal, vol. 28 (September 1975), pp.
315-34. .
Hufbauer, G.C., "A Guide to Law and Policy," in Hufbauer et al., U.S.
Taxation of American Business Abroad: An Exchange of Views
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), pp. 1-6.
McLure, Charles E., Jr., "Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income
Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,"
Harvard Law Review, vol. 88 (January 1975), pp. 532-82.
McLure, Charles E., Jr., "A Status Report on Tax Integration in the
United States," National Tax Journal, Vol. 31 (December 1978).
McLure, Charles E., Jr., "Integration of the Income Taxes: Why and How,"
Journal of Corporate Taxation, vol. 2 (Winter 1976), pp. 429-64.McLure, Charles E., Jr., Can Corporate Income be Taxed Once? (Washington:
The Brooking Institution, 1979).
McLure, Charles E., Jr. and Surrey, Stanley S., "Integration of
Corporation and Individual Income Taxes: Issues for Debate,"
Harvard Business Review, vol. 55 (September-October 1977), pp.
169-81.
Musgrave, Peggy B., United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School International Tax
Program, 1969).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Company Tax
Systems in OECD Member Countries (Paris: OECD, 1973).
Report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee (Neumark Committee)," The
EEC Re orts on Tax Harmonization (Amsterdam: International Bureau
for Fiscal Documentation, 19 3 •
Royal Commission on Taxation, Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966).
Sato, Mitsuo and Bird, Richard M., "International Aspects of the Taxation
of Corporations and Shareholders," International Monetary Fund
Staff Papers, vol. 22 (July 1975), pp. 384-455.
Simon, William E., Testimony Before the House Ways and Means Committee,
July 31, 1975.
Snoy, Bernard, Taxes on Direct Investment Income in the EEC: A Le al and
Economic Analysis New York: Praeger, 1975
Ullman, Al, Congressional Record, House, 95th Congress, Second Session,
February 2, 1978, pp. H640-42 and March 22, 1978, pp. H2337-38.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Blue rints for Basic Tax Reform
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 197
Warren, Alvin C., Jr.,"Integration of the Indi-yidual and Corporate Income
Taxes," a paper presented to an ALI-ABA conference on federal
tax simplification, Warrenton, Virginia, January 1978.
van den Tempel, A.J., Corporation Tax and Individual Income Tax in the
European Communities (Brussels: Commission of the European
Communities, 1970).